For many years, the conventional wisdom among economists was that capital account convertibility provides countries unambiguous economic benefits via both improved capital allocation and increased opportunities to smooth consumption via international borrowing. This wisdom, it turned out, was based primarily on an a priori argument rather than supported strongly by empirics. Some attempts to demonstrate a linkage between international financial integration via capital account convertibility, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other, have been disappointing at best (Eichengreen 2001; Prasad and Rajan 2008) . Moreover, substantial evidence has accumulated that under some circumstances the introduction of capital account convertibility can precipitate financial crises. Finally, in some cases, such as during the Asian Financial crisis of the late 1990s, countries that had retained strong capital controls came through crises better than those that had liberalized earlier. More generally, across a large number of crisis episodes countries with capital controls in place prior to the outbreak of a crisis suffered significantly lower drops in real economic output than countries without such controls.
Despite the erosion of consensus on its economic benefits, capital account convertibility remains a long-term goal for China. The goal of "gradually realizing convertibility of the capital account" stated that "a convertible yuan remains the ultimate goal for the nation's currency exchange rate reform." 3 Vice-Governor Yi noted that most countries achieve capital account convertibility within 7 to 10 years after making their currencies convertible for current account transactions. China achieved the latter in December 1996, but Yi explained that China's longer than usual transition was due to its size and unbalanced development.
Preconditions for cAPitAl Account convertibility
Broadly speaking there are three important preconditions for moving to capital account liberalization:
a strong domestic banking system, relatively developed domestic financial markets, and an equilibrium exchange rate. We examine each of these in turn.
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strength of the domestic banking system
The first precondition for capital account convertibility is a strong domestic banking system. When capital controls are relaxed typically domestic residents (or financial institutions holding funds on behalf of domestic residents) diversify the currency composition of their assets, leading to an outflow of funds from the domestic banking system. When a country's banking system is perceived as weak, opening the capital account can accelerate these outflows as depositors move funds to the presumed relative safety of foreign banks. If sufficiently large, these outflows, in turn, can lead to a sharp decline in the value of the domestic currency. If there are currency mismatches under these conditions, firms and individuals with foreign-currency denominated debts but income denominated only or largely in domestic-currency will experience a sharp increase in the burden of servicing their loans, potentially leading to a broad financial crisis. This concern is particularly salient in China where bank deposits by year-end 2009 reached RMB61.2 trillion (US$8.96 trillion), 4 an extraordinary 183 percent of GDP (People's Bank of China, Monetary Analysis Small Group 2010, 1). 5 More than 90 percent of these deposits are controlled by households and non-financial corporations. These deposits are most likely to migrate out of Chinese banks in anticipation of or in the early stages of a crisis.
China's banks now appear to be enormously stronger than they were in the mid-1990s when the largest financial institutions were insolvent, leading ultimately to massive government injections of capital and a write off of the non-performing loans that had accumulated in the banking system over many years (Lardy 1998, 5; Ma Guonan 2006) . Following these write-offs, the authorities engineered reforms in the governance of China's largest banks, further injections of capital by foreign strategic investors, and public listings of bank shares on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets.
The financial transformation of the banking system that resulted is reflected in three key indicators. ratios by sharply stepping up their issuance of subordinated debt. But it eventuated that the banks were merely selling much of this debt to each other. 7 The regulator, recognizing that these cross-holdings of subordinated debt did nothing to increase capital in the banking system as a whole, ruled in a matter of months that subordinated debt held by other banks could not be counted as part of a bank's capital. 8 Instead, in 2010 the CBRC compelled China's four major banks to raise RMB 264.4 billion (US$39.1 billion) in new capital via rights issues and the sale of convertible bonds. 9 With regard to risk weighting of assets, the CBRC eliminated more than a decade ago such dodgy procedures as allowing banks to hold little or no capital against loans made to state-owned companies.
Are profits overstated because of lax loan classification standards and weak provisioning Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and China Merchants Bank, respectively. But, as reflected in Table 1 , at the same banks the average yield on loans to households was 4.93 percent, 5.37 percent, and 5.07 percent, respectively. These numbers mean that these banks achieved spreads on lending to households that exceeded the net interest spread these banks enjoyed on their entire range of assets and liabilities by approximately two-fifths to two-thirds. This differential arose for two reasons. First, these banks held other assets that earned much less than their earnings on lending to households. For example, they earned only 1.6 percent on required reserves placed at the central bank and only slightly more on their large holdings of bonds issued by the central bank to sterilize increases in the domestic money supply resulting from its intervention in foreign exchange markets. 14 And second, banks had to pay substantially higher interest rates on some of their liabilities than they paid on household deposits. Second, in the long-run interest rate liberalization is essential to the strengthening of China's banking system. As long as banks operate in a highly cosseted interest rate environment, competition in the banking system will remain limited and banks will have insufficient ability and incentive to price risk appropriately and operate on a commercial basis. Thus the allocation of funds by the banking would remain less efficient than would be the case if banks operated in a liberalized interest rate environment.
level of development of the financial system
A second prerequisite for the liberalization of the capital account is a well-developed capital market. There are at least two reasons for this. First, capital markets can provide an additional source of funding for the corporate sector thereby providing more competition for domestic banks and hastening the banks' transition to operation on a fully commercial basis. Second, deeper local debt markets make it easier for a country to ease restrictions on capital flows because deep markets make it easier to to absorb large capital 
flexibility of the exchange rate
A third precondition for a successful transition to capital account convertibility is an exchange rate that is reasonably close to its underlying equilibrium level. A move to capital account convertibility when an exchange rate is substantially under-(over-) valued will precipitate capital in (out) flows that can be destabilizing. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the renminbi is significantly undervalued. A survey of 18 studies of the Chinese exchange rate found that: all but one concluded that the renminbi was undervalued; the average estimate of the needed appreciation in the real effective exchange rate was 
Progress to dAte on cAPitAl Account liberAlizAtion
While China achieved full current account convertibility in late 1996, its progress on capital account convertibility has proceeded slowly and in discrete stages. In December 1993, China's authorities publicly stated that, "The long-term goal of China's foreign exchange reforms is to realize the convertibility of the renminbi. In order to reach this goal, we must move gradually and in the proper sequence of events" (Hu Xiaolian 2009) In effect this has meant achieving convertibility on current account transactions before capital account transactions and loosening restrictions on capital inflows before loosening restrictions on capital outflows.
In the decade following China's reform and opening, the government showed a new willingness to use foreign capital to fund domestic investment. The majority of this capital came in the form of foreign loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and foreign governments. China's objective was to attract long-term stable forms of investment and take advantage of favorable lending rates abroad. These loan inflows marked a major policy shift but remained modest in size, reaching a peak of just 1.68 percent of GDP in 1990.
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China took more significant steps toward liberalization when it loosened constraints on foreign direct investment (FDI) beginning in the early 1990s. These liberalization policies included: 1) shifting decision-making power regarding the screening and approval of FDI from the central government toward local governments; 2) relaxing ownership restrictions away from joint-venture requirements and allowing a greater proportion of FDI to come from wholly-owned foreign enterprises; 3) increasing managerial autonomy relating to pricing and financial decisions; 4) offering concessions on customs duties, income taxes, and taxes on profit remittances; and 5) relaxing sectoral controls and opening up the services sector, including the banking, retailing and telecommunications industries.
Inward FDI in manufacturing is now almost completely liberalized in China with the exception of restrictions in some "strategic" sectors and, in some cases, limits on the extent and form of foreign ownership. There are more restrictions on FDI in China's service sector, particularly telecommunications and financial services including banking, insurance, and securities. Foreign companies are permitted to make withdrawals from their foreign exchange accounts and convert local currency to make external current account payments of profits and dividends so long as the payments are consistent with their business scope, and, in the case of joint venture companies, approved by the firm's board of directors.
China's relatively accommodative stance has made it the world's second largest destination for FDI. In addition, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has provided domestic firms with easier access to foreign exchange by relaxing capital controls over time and has provided firms investing with more opportunities to raise capital. SAFE draft regulations, published in May 2009, allow domestic firms to register the source of their foreign exchange financing after their investment overseas rather than requiring approval in advance. 20 These new rules also permit firms to raise capital from more sources, including domestic foreign exchange loans, foreign exchange purchased with renminbi, foreign currency funds already possessed by the firm, and retained profits from overseas.
Yet, China's investment outflows are dwarfed by FDI inflows and its ODFI remains low by most measures. 21 In 2009, China's share of global ODFI flows was 4 percent and by year-end its share of the stock was 1.2 percent-a significant increase compared to previous years but still small considering China is now the world's second largest economy. 22 Overseas FDI assets as a share of GDP were less than Retail investor interest in QDII funds declined dramatically in response to the global economic crisis after nearly two years of steady quota expansion. In the 17 months to end-September 2009, the number of QDII licensed institutions and total approved investment funds accumulated remained fixed at 56 and $50.7 billion, respectively. 23 Demand for quotas was so weak during this period that, by end-August 2009, domestic investors had invested only half their total approved funds abroad, prompting SAFE to warn that it would reduce quotas for QDII investors that did not make full use of them. Second since August the mainland authorities have granted Hong Kong banks involved in renminbi cross-border trade settlement access to the on-shore interbank bond market. Thus, these banks can now invest their renminbi funds in bonds issued in China and traded on the interbank bond market. This allows these banks to purchase higher-yielding renminbi denominated financial assets rather than holding low-yielding deposits with the clearing bank. This, in turn, allows them to offer higher rates on renminbi deposits, making Hong Kong exporters more willing to settle their transactions with their mainland
Chinese clients in renminbi.
In the short run it is not clear whether China gains in pure economic terms from this increased internationalization of the renminbi. As already noted renminbi settlement has been dominated by Chinese importers, rather than exporters. This means increased off-shore holdings of renminbi, which at the margin increases rather than decreases the pressure for renminbi appreciation in the onshore foreign exchange market. It is sometimes argued denominating and settling trade contracts in renminbi allows
Chinese firms to escape foreign exchange risk without assuming any hedging costs. This seems unlikely because in a competitive market if foreign firms were required to assume these costs that they would adjust their prices appropriately rather than accepting reduced profits.
The more uncertain question is whether internationalization will ultimately help pave the way for capital account convertibility. Since historically substantial capital account convertibility has preceded the international use of currencies, we are to some extent in uncharted territory. To date the source of all off-shore renminbi deposits in Hong Kong derives from current account transactions, for example renminbi earnings from exporting to China or Chinese tourism. Whether or not foreign investors will be happy to hold increasingly significant amounts of renminbi deposits offshore while China's capital account remains largely closed will determine the success of the internationalization strategy, as currently pursued by the Chinese authorities.
Policy recommendAtions
China has made some progress in relaxing capital controls over the past three decades. The authorities aggressively liberalized inbound foreign direct investment from the outset of the reform process and China faces significant challenges in moving toward a substantially more liberalized capital account.
First is the state of the domestic banking system. The banking system has been strengthened substantially over the past decade, but its strong recent financial performance may owe as much to the central bank's interest rate controls as to the improved ability of banks to price risk appropriately. As Xiao Gang has acknowledged, "Growing big is the best way for Chinese banks to make more money under the current financial environment. This model of growth, however, neither assures the long-term sustainable development of the banking sector nor satisfies the need of a balanced economic and social structure."
Gradual relaxation of remaining interest rate controls, particularly the ceilings on rates for deposits of various maturities, is an essential precondition to the emergence of a robust, fully commercially-oriented Third, China's exchange rate remains significantly undervalued. Consequently, substantially liberalizing the capital account before the value of the renminbi is closer to an underlying equilibrium level would likely generate large-scale speculative capital inflows based on the expectation of a large renminbi appreciation. These inflows could undermine the ability of the central bank to maintain price stability. Thus allowing gradual appreciation of the currency and greater exchange rate flexibility is also an essential precondition to moving toward further liberalization of the capital account. 
